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RECENT DECISIONS
Grand & Sixth Bldg., Inc., 206 Wis. 100, 238 N.W. 867 (1931); Washburn v.
Skogg, 204 Wis. 29, 233 N.W. 764 (1931). A "frequenter" is defined as "every
person other than an employee who may go in or be in a public building under
circumstances which render him other than a trespasser." Wis. STAT. (1933)
§ 101.01. A trespasser is one on the premises without invitation, express or im-
plied, and solely for his own pleasure, convenience, or purpose. Peake v. Buell,
90 Wis. 508, 63 N.W. 1053 (1895) ; Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131, 145 N.W. 971
(1914) ; Klemnens v. Morrow Milling Co., 171 Wis. 614, 177 N.W. 903 (1920). The
duty of the owner to maintain in a safe condition a building that is a public
building under the statute extends only to that portion of the premises which
is used by tenants or the public. Gobas v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., 179 Wis. 256,
191 N.W. 509 (1923) ; Bewley v. Kipp, 202 Wis. 411, 233 N.W. 71 (1930). In the
instant case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with
the statute stipulating the degree of safety necessary in buildings of this char-
acter. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 101.06. This allegation would have been correct had
the plaintiff sustained injuries under similar circumstances in some portion of the
building provided for the use of tenants. The trial court held the plaintiff to be a
frequenter, not a trespasser, and therefore within the protection of the statute.
This contention was overruled on appeal, the court stating that since the plaintiff
entered a portion of the building not maintained for the use of the tenants and
and to which the tenants were not invited, either expressly or by implication ,she
became a trespasser. Since a trespasser is afforded no protection under the
statute, the plaintiff has no cause of action.
CLAYToN A. CAmE.
TRADE MARKS-UNFAIR COMPETITION-RIGHT OF PmvAcy-The plaintiff is a
manufacturer of baseball bats. For a consideration, paid to the persons concerned,
it obtained the exclusive right to use the names of prominent baseball players.
The defendant company is a competitor of the plaintiff. Without authority from
the assignors or from the plaintiff, the defendant used the same names on its
manufactured product. There is no question of similarity in appearance of the
two sets of bats. The plaintiff asked for an injunction restraining the defendant
from using on its bats the names of the baseball players who had given to the
plaintiff the exclusive right to the use of their names. The trial court granted the
relief as requested. On appeal, held, judgment modified, and as modified, affirmed;
the defendant's conduct amounted to unfair competition. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hil-
lerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F. (2d) 763 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
Whether a person will be protected against the indiscriminate use of his
name depends in each jurisdiction on the choice of policy made by the court or
the legislature therein. It has been held that a prominent man cannot during his
life, nor can his widow after his death, get relief against the use of his name
and likeness in the advertising of articles for public sale where there is nothing
libellous about the picture. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372,
80 N.W. 285, 45 L.R.A. 219 (1899). It was suggested therein that a person in
public life waives his right to privacy to the extent that the public, too, has an
interest in his likeness. An important court has held that no person will be
protected against the indiscriminate use of his likeness or name by third parties
until the legislature shall so prescribe. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 59 L.R.A. 478 (1902) ; but see contra, Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101 (1905) and Munden
v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911). Under the Civil Rights Law
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(Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York, 1930), Article V, Paragraphs 50 and
51, the legislature of New York has prescribed that the use of the name of a
living person without his consent for the purposes of advertising or trade is a
misdemeanor, and that the person whose name is so used may sue to restrain
such use and recover damages from the defendant. The statutory directions have
been carried out by the courts. See Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y.
51, 103 N.E. 1108, L.R.A. 1915C, 839 (1913). It is obvious that where the indi-
vidual himself cannot restrain the use of his own name by a third party his
assignee cannot do so. And it has been held that the transfer of a name without a
business is not enough to prevent others than the transferee from using the name.
L. E. Waterman Co. v. Moderr Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 35 Sup. Ct. 91, 59 L.ed. 142
(1914). In those jurisdictions where a private individual is protected himself
against the use of his name or likeness by third parties it does not follow there-
from that his assignee will be so protected. It has been held in a comparatively
recent case that where a person's name has associated with its use something of
value for advertising purposes, interests of a pecuniary nature resembling prop-
erty rights are created in the name, and that these can be transferred so that
the transferee will receive the protection of the equity court against its use by
third parties. Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.C. Mass.
1934). It is to be noted, however, that in that case the person's name had
acquired its advertising value by reason of its being associated with the trans-
feree's business. It has been held, too, that where the assignor's name has
acquired something of good will by reason of its association with his own
business, the transferee of the business may be protected against the
assignor's use of his name in that business or against his assigning it to some
competitor of the original transferee. Nisley Shoe Co. v. Nisley Co., 72 F. (2d)
118 (C.C.A. 6th, 1934). Perhaps there is in all of the cases between an assignee
and the original assignor or some third party over the latter's carrying on busi-
ness with the use of the same or like name as the assignor some element of
what the court feels is unfair competition upon which it predicates any relief that
it chooses to give. Along with the cases already cited, see A. Weiskittel & Son
Co. v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., (Md. 1934) 173 Atl. 48; Andrew Jergens C. v.
Bonded Products Corporation, 13 F. (2d) 417 (E.D. N.Y. 1926); C. A. Briggs
Co. v. National Wafer Co., 215 Mass. 100, 102 N.E. 87 (1913). In the principal
case the court felt that the plaintiff was entitled to relief, not as an assignee of
the "right to use" the names, but by reason of the fact that the defendant, by its
advertising scheme, was getting a part of the plaintiff's trade. By the decree as
finally ordered the defendant was allowed to use the names on its manufac-
tured product providing the names were followed by the words "style" or "shape."
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